The dynamics of neo-liberal restructuring have generated serious tensions in the institutional alignments between social democratic political parties and labor unions in Western Europe. This article explores the origins, development and consequences of the resulting political crisis through a detailed analysis of the institutional alignment of parties and unions in Sweden, Germany, UK and France. The authors reject the argument that the changing contours of the party-union nexus can be understood solely on the basis of a rational choice analysis of labor movement actors in favor of an account that also highlights the importance of historical path dependency and ideological orientation. The resulting complexity of union response to the crisis of the party-union nexus is explored through the construction of a typology that charts union reorientation along the dimensions of accommodation with or resistance against neoliberalism and within and beyond the national political context. The alliance between these 'parties of labor' and unions was based on the ability and willingness of social democratic political parties to pursue labor-friendly legislative reforms when in government in return for moderation and restraint by trade union leaders in the arena of industrial relations and wage demands. These arrangements usually followed the triumph of social democracy over revolutionary socialism or Communism and the adoption of a reformist orientation based on the use of state power to pursue the interests of labor within the boundaries of the capitalist economy and the liberal democratic polity (Esping-Andersen,
A key feature of West European social democracy has been the existence of an organic institutional linkage between social democratic political parties and trade unions. A dominant party-union nexus (DPUN) emerged in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries which institutionalized a network of reciprocal relations between the 'economic' and 'political'
wings of the labor movement in Europe (Pizzorno, 1978) . There were also important examples of party-union alignments in parts of Latin America (Collier and Collier, 1991) .
The alliance between these 'parties of labor' and unions was based on the ability and willingness of social democratic political parties to pursue labor-friendly legislative reforms when in government in return for moderation and restraint by trade union leaders in the arena of industrial relations and wage demands. These arrangements usually followed the triumph of social democracy over revolutionary socialism or Communism and the adoption of a reformist orientation based on the use of state power to pursue the interests of labor within the boundaries of the capitalist economy and the liberal democratic polity (Esping-Andersen, 2 1985; Przeworski, 1985; Przeworski & Sprague, 1986) . Trade unions were accepted by ruling elites as legitimate societal actors provided they did not challenge property rights and management control of the enterprise. These arrangements were consolidated through modes of regulation which institutionalized social conflict through bi-and trilateral neo-corporatist arrangements between unions, employers and the state (Moschonas, 2002: 63) . The stability and persistence of these arrangements in the post-war period was based on the ability of social democratic governments to pursue Keynesian policies within the international stability provided by the Bretton Woods monetary system and the associated mechanisms of corporatist interest mediation were a key component of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS).
The collapse of these certainties and the adaption of social democracy to the dynamics of neo-liberal restructuring have led social democratic governments to pursue policies that have negative consequences for organized labor (See McIlroy, 2009 for an elaboration of this argument in the UK context and more generally Ross and Martin, 1999) . This has produced new tensions between social democratic parties and their trade union partners. In this context, trade unions have sought autonomy from social democratic parties in order to struggle against the neo-liberal policies of social democratic governments. Such state-union tensions have been especially intense in the public sector, where neo-liberal policies have 'rolled back' the state in order to reduce welfare spending and to dilute pension provision.
The development of neo-corporatism was marked by an incomplete and contingent attempt by the social democratic state to incorporate and promote labor as a responsible 'partner' in civil society. This served to soften the radicalism of labor movement politics by marginalizing its militant wing. Indeed, social democracy involved the 'statization of society' (Panitch, 1986: 189) or 'statization of social life' (Poulantzas, 1978) as the institutional boundaries between state and society became increasingly blurred and indistinct. The bureaucratic forms of representation which resulted from the 'institutionalization' of trade unions within 'pluralist' industrial relations systems created serious tensions and tended to erode the legitimacy of union leaders amongst rank-and-file union members and temper the societal mobilizing capacity of trade unions (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1985; Müller-Jentsch, 1986; Darlington, 1994) and undermined the ability of unions to develop innovative organizing techniques associated with 'new' social movements. Neoliberal restructuring, however, encourages the 'opening-up' of civil society through the dilution of these neocorporatist institutions and encourages the development of new and innovative forms of 3 union organization and mobilization. This raises the issue as to whether these developments result in either the radicalization or moderation of labor movement politics as the institutional and ideological chains that link trade unions to reformist social democratic parties begin to fragment under the pressure of neo-liberal globalization? There is evidence that in the context of neo-liberal restructuring, progressive parties of the left and trade unions have been reappraising the nature of the existing reciprocal relationships. New alliances are being created including those between trade unions and non-aligned parties of the left and 'civil society' movements and campaigns (Robinson, 2000 (Robinson, , 2003 . The result has been a crisis of the dominant party-union nexus in Latin American and Western European societies.
Katrina Burgess (1999 Burgess ( , 2004 has attempted to explore these questions through a rational action approach based on the cost-benefit decisions of party political and trade union actors. However, we would suggest that this approach lacks historical contextual nuance and also downplays the tensions within social democracy and 'social democratic trade unionism'.
In this article, we present an analysis of the fragmentation of party-union alliances and the subsequent partial re-orientation of trade unions in Western Europe. We develop an alternative approach to Burgess by focusing on the importance of historical path dependency and ideology in the framing of trade union orientations to their relationship with political parties. We then explore the crisis of the party-union alliances in Western Europe which, we argue, is based on the crisis of 'political economism' (Hyman, 2001) or 'social democratic' trade unionism (Padgett & Patterson, 1991:177) . We focus on the particular cases of Sweden, Germany, UK and France in order to highlight both the specific ways that neoliberal reforms have been introduced in these societies and the ways in which the responses of party-aligned unions have been shaped and constrained by institutional path dependencies and ideologically framed trade union identities. In the following section, we present a typology of trade union strategic re-orientation in Western Europe. We focus on two interrelated processes of reorientation. First, the extent to which strains within the dominant party-union nexus are producing divisions within and fractures between unions on the basis of an accommodation to, or resistance against, neo-liberalism. Second, the degree to which a weakening of the party-union nexus is resulting in the emergence of new union identities that express either revised forms of social democracy or its rejection in favor of a more radical politics. We conclude with a critical assessment of the potential for 'radical political unionism' in Western
Europe in the context of the decline and decomposition of party-union relationships.
Party-union alliances and the 'loyalty dilemma': The limits of rationality. Burgess (1999: 105-11) has conceptualized party-union alliances as 'regimes' underpinned by rules, norms and decision-making procedures. The expectations of actors converge and form and reinforce bonds of loyalty and trust on the basis of rational expectations of future behavior between political parties and their trade union allies. In the context of stable postwar settlements, reserves of loyalty were built up between parties and unions. Unions mediated between workers and Government as 'managers of a virtuous circle of loyalty' (Burgess, ibid: 110) . (1970) to suggest that the rational responses of labor leaders to this depletion of 'loyalty' have been 'voice' and 'exit'. In contrast to individuals facing a commercial or bureaucratic organization, however, the costs of exit for labor leaders are likely to exceed the costs of voice and, therefore, voice is the default position for labor leaders facing a loyalty dilemma.
Based on the ideal typical cases of Mexico, Venezuela and Spain, Burgess (2004: 8-11) constructs a four-position continuum of potential responses by labor leaders spanning loyalty and exit through 'norm-based' and 'norm-breaking' voice. The position of labor movements along this continuum is determined by the ways in which trade union and party leaders respond to the 'loyalty dilemma' and the marginal costs and benefits associated with being disloyal to either rank-and-file workers or a labor-aligned government. Burgess (2004: 6) argues that the responses of disaffected labor leaders can be explained by two variables: the relative power of the party and workers to punish labor leaders for disloyal behavior and the capacity of a party to act autonomously from its own government. These factors provide divergent levels of power and autonomy that determine the different responses of labor leaders. In response to neo-liberal restructuring and the resulting 'loyalty dilemma', it is argued, both parties and unions have utilized the political opportunity structure in order to loosen the alliance and recuperate their autonomy. In this 5 situation, trade unions are able to switch allegiances owing to the proliferation of potential allies in the party system and civil society. The corollary of this analysis is that unions are likely to refocus on workplace issues and the building of broad alliances in civil society in opposition to unfavorable government policies. The loosening of party-union ties is thus likely to increase the potential for the emergence of 'social movement unionism' and alliances with new social movements on the basis of informal, issue-based and contingent alliances.
There are important insights in the work of Burgess and her model highlights clearly the importance of the strategic decisions of labor and party leaders in the context of social and political change. While this approach is applied to the particular cases of Mexico, Venezuela and Spain, Burgess is concerned to generalize this model to party-union relations in general (Burgess, 2004: 9-11) . However, the 'rational action' approach of Burgess tends to ignore historical path dependencies and, in focusing on the rational orientations of labor movement leaders and activists, tends to downplay the importance of ideology in the framing and reorientation of union identities. In contrast to this rational action approach we present a historically grounded account of the crisis of party-union alliances in Western Europe which takes as its starting point the institutional context. Institutional continuity and change should be understood in terms of both the historical constraints imposed by 'path dependency' and the dynamic agency of 'path shapers' (Nielsen et al 1995) . The 'path dependency' of partyunion alliances in Latin America and Spain are different in fundamental ways from those prevalent in Western Europe and indeed, there are differing path dependencies within Western Europe (Crouch 1993) . The specificity of divergent 'path dependencies' renders any general theory of party-union relations extremely problematic and it is similarly problematic to deduce any straightforward trajectory of trade union re-orientation following the crisis and de-composition of a party-union nexus. In Western Europe, unions developed a degree of autonomy from their political allies and the alliance was often formalized through a 'historic' compromise between the leaderships of organized labor and the social democratic state.
National Variance within the liberal democratic states of Western Europe flowed from the perceived need for trade union leaderships to maintain the 'balance' between class solidarity and national (bourgeois) interests. This balance was contained in specific political settlements (Crouch, 1993; Hyman, 2001 ) whereby government concessions were granted to the union leaders in return for them exerting some discipline over rank-and-file wage 6 militancy (Flanders, 1974; Coates 1984 , Hassel 2003 . This required a specific set of partyunion arrangements based on centralized and representative trade unions with well articulated mechanisms of control between leadership and membership base and powerful and favorably disposed social democratic political parties that were able and willing to deliver concessions.
This process and its associated mechanisms provided the motivation for trade unions to engage in neo-corporatist exchange.
There were, therefore, important structural and institutional factors that shaped the strength and durability of a party-union nexus: namely, the density and centralization of a labor movement, the closeness of its relations with a social democratic party and the 'governmental fitness' of the social democratic party (Moschonas, 2002: 68) . However, the social democratic compromise was always deeply contradictory. Social democratic parties of government presented themselves simultaneously as parties of the working class and parties of the people in general (Przeworski, 1985: 24-5) . 
Neo-liberalism and the crisis of the party-union nexus in Western Europe
In this section, we explore the cases of Sweden, Germany, UK and France in order to highlight the importance of historical path dependency to the development and crisis of the DPUN. In each case we explore the national specificity of the party-union nexus and the ways in which the DPUN has been subject to decomposition. There are a number of important changes that have undermined the social democratic form and content of the arrangements that underpinned party-union ties in Western Europe. In general, the deindustrialization of advanced European societies and the privatization and marketization of state-owned and administered industries and public services have been key points of pressure.
Ruling economic and political elites have become increasingly unable or unwilling to offer concessions to organized labor. Social democratic political parties have submitted to this pressure and have been increasingly attracted to neoliberal policy prescriptions in the name of national business competitiveness. Where concessions to organized labor have remained, these have increasingly taken the form of defensive or 'dented shield' forms of social pacts associated with 'competitive corporatism' in which trade unions attempt to mitigate the worst effects of neoliberal restructuring (Rhodes, 1998) . There have, however, been important differences with regard to the specific ways in which a neo-liberal agenda has been pursued by West European 'parties of labor' when in power and the dominant response of trade unions to neo-liberal reforms. In the UK, New Labour when in government between 1997
and 2010 attempted to introduce a new 'shared value' centered on 'Third Way' partnership and consensus. In Germany, France and Sweden, in contrast, the new capital accumulation strategy has involved a shift from consensus to confrontation. In Sweden, trade union opposition to neo-liberal restructuring has been somewhat muted and undeveloped and trade unions in the manufacturing and export sectors have developed an accommodation to neoliberal restructuring (Bieler, 2006) . In the UK, France and Germany there has been a complex pattern of accommodation and resistance. Attempts to mitigate the worst aspects of neoliberalism through 'risk-reducing' partnership strategies sit alongside attempts to resurrect traditional forms of social democracy. More radical opposition has also occurred in the form of open hostility to neo-liberalism from dissident union and political groupings based on a rejection of the retreat of the state from its former role and functions. We argue that these divergent responses have been conditioned and constrained by the specificity of the DPUN.
This has affected how the dynamics of neo-liberal restructuring have impacted on the strength and durability of the DPUN in particular nation states.
In Sweden, the DPUN was based on an unparalleled intimacy between the Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbeteparti (SAP) and the Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO). This relationship was based on high levels of union density, an overlapping membership and a shared ideological vision between the LO and SAP. The unparalleled electoral success of the 8 SAP was instrumental to the development of the 'Swedish Model' based on centralized bipartisan bargaining and the 1938 Basic Agreement which was an explicit 'class compromise' through which the LO secured high levels of social welfare in return for their involvement and support in the Rehn-Meidner model of growth that delivered high levels of productivity and profitability (see Fulcher, 1991; Kjellberg, 1992) . (Bell and Shaw, 1983) and the crisis and fragmentation of the French Communist Party (PCF) (Ross and Jenson, 1994) . At the heart of social democracy is the belief that capitalism can be humanized in order to realize the socialist values of political democracy and economic equality. In programmatic terms, this has implied using the levers of the democratic nation state in order to intervene in the national economy. However, as an ideology which seeks to reform capitalism, social democracy is constantly subject to transformation by the dynamism of capitalism itself. Neoliberalism poses a particular threat to the discourse and practice of social democracy as it undermines the democratic and regulatory practice of the nation state. We suggest that the both social democratic and conservative parties and trade unions (Leggett, 2007) . In other words, trade unions can exercise varying degrees of 'norm based' and 'norm breaking'
'voice' in order to lobby the 'party of labor' for a return to 'traditional social democracy'.
The ways in which 'voice' is exercised, however, is framed by the density of specific social democratic settlements and the ideological inheritance of divergent trade union identities that condition and constrain the decisions of 'path shaping' trade union actors. In contrast to the Third Way, this orientation questions the inevitability of globalization and argues that it remains possible through the power of agency to reformulate the state-capital-labor relationship in the interest of labor (Garrett, 1998 : Wickham-Jones, 2000 . For trade unions, such a position implies a project to 'reclaim' social democracy and the maintenance of a struggle between 'left' and 'right' within the national party machinery (Taylor, 2003) . In
Sweden, for example, there are emerging divisions between unions organizing in the domestic and international sectors with regard to how to respond to the impact of globalization on the 'Swedish Model' between a 'defend and restore' camp and a 'modernize and adapt' camp (Bieler and Lindberg, 2008) . A strategy of 'internal lobbying' is now seen Employment Strategy. The prospects for EU-wide Keynesianism 'from above', however, appear to be receding as EU policy has been steered with social democratic complicity towards a supra-national project of supply side reforms, 'flexicurity' and employability (Cammack 2004 ). This has also become evident in the UK with the emergence of an important anti-EU discourse amongst union leaders committed to the restoration of traditional social democracy.
Fourth, unions have the option of embracing the deinstitutionalization of the relationship between party and unions and re-framing their ideological orientation in line with a radical agenda that goes beyond traditional social democracy. The radicalized political unionism orientation represents both an institutional and ideological break from social democratic trade unionism and a rupture of the party-union nexus. Unions are thus able to exploit the 'opening-up' of civil society in order to liberate themselves from the institutional and ideological fetters of social democratic trade unionism and re-establish themselves as autonomous 'movements' in civil society. However, the resulting exit is both institutional and ideological and can result in new trade union identities that can be defined as 'radical political' rather than 'social democratic'. This approach is both post-national and oppositional and has involved the re-framing of trade union identities and orientations around the global justice agenda (Tucker, 1991; Edwards, 2008) . While there are examples of this orientation throughout Western Europe, it is important to note that it is the least developed of the four tendencies outlined in this article. Radical political unionism is a specific response by sections of the unions in Western Europe to the breakdown of 'trust' between actors in the old pluralist landscape. This orientation highlights the breakdown of institutionalized alliances and bureaucratic modes of organization and the mobilization of 'networked' trade unions (Passy, 2003: 41) in an increasingly transnational civil society (Moody, 1997) .
Unsurprisingly, this mode of trade union orientation is least developed in Sweden where 'political unionism' remains wedded to the defense of social democratic values (Vandenberg, 2006) . In France, examples of this reorientation can be located in the militant orientation of the SUD and others in the G-10 over the pensions issue and public sector cuts (Damesin and Denis, 2005) . In Germany, it is manifest in the willingness of left oriented sections of IG Metall and Ver.di to engage with Die Linke and mobilize against the Hartz reforms (Jüncke, 2007) . In the UK, this orientation can be seen in the increased mobilizing capacity (and sometimes membership) of the 'rejectionist' FBU (Fitzgerald, 2005) , the CWU in the Royal Mail (Beale, 2003) , the RMT (Darlington, 2007) and PCS in their fight against public service cuts.
Conclusion: Beyond the chains that bind…….
The de-institutionalizing dynamics of neo-liberalism have clearly impacted on the established relationships between trade unions and social democratic political parties in Western Europe.
The recomposition of social democracy around a Third Way agenda of supply side flexibility and marketization has shifted the terrain on which party-union alignments operate and transformed the meaning and logic underpinning a historically determined DPUN. The rules of the game have shifted from a positive and dynamic relationship between party and unions that harnessed the conflict between capital and labor within a national arena of compromise and trust to a negative relationship between parties and unions that seeks to negate the autonomous power and interests of labor and subordinate the narrow 'national interest' within a globalizing economy. This is why the rational action approach of Burgess is ultimately insufficient to the task of understanding the nature of party-union relationships in the contemporary world. The decisions surrounding 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty' are based not only on a rational assessment of costs and benefits, but an agenda which is attempting to ameliorate the worst consequences of neo-liberalism through the institutional and ideological frame inherited from national social democratic settlements. The unions and union confederations that truly 'exit' do so in both an institutional and ideological way. The latter involves the final and perhaps irreconcilable rupture of the social democratic compromise that has enabled unions to break free of the ideological fetters of 'constraint' and the 'national interest' and to become radical political unions in an increasingly global civil society.
Trade unions are and remain both 'economic' and 'political actors' and the 'politics of production' are inevitably underwritten by the 'politics of politics' (Burawoy, 1985: 254) .
Trade unions are, moreover, relatively powerless within the political sphere and have always been essentially defensive and reactive in terms of their political behavior (Taylor, 1989: xiv) . These propositions remain valid, but it surely inadequate to measure and assess the 'political' behavior of trade unions in terms of 'nation state' dynamics that were developed and consolidated during the period of Keynesian welfare statism (cf. Hyman and GumbrellMcCormick, 2010) . As argue, the relationship between the economic and political behavior of trade unions reflect the dynamics of ideology, opportunity structure, organizational capacity and contextual challenges. However, the process of neo-liberal restructuring has transformed the terrain on which these dynamics operate and indeed transformed the discursive and material meaning and significance of these dynamics and processes. The ideological foundations of social democratic settlements have crumbed and recomposed in complex ways that escape the established discursive formulations around 'class' and 'nation'. The 'political' opportunity structures that trade unions face are similarly complex and include important examples of sub-and transnational realignment between parties and unions. The 'opening up' of civil society has the potential to blur the organization and institutional boundaries between the labor movement and other civil society actors in ways that complexify the 'organizational capacity' of trade unions.
Ultimately, the process of neo-liberal restructuring has transformed the nation state. The nation state has not been weakened, but transformed by neo-liberal globalization and remains the central focus of political agency and struggle. However, as Sørensen (2004) has argued, the state has been transformed from an agency of economic management to a 'proceduralregulatory agency' which takes a polymorphous form with networks of other state and nonstate actors. In the resulting reconfigurations of power and ideology, traditional conceptions of trade union 'politics', and in particular, the party-union nexus, are becoming increasingly anachronistic and marginal.
